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THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS: A CONTINUED 
DISSECTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
FAITH-BASED PRISON UNITS 
Lynn S. Branham †
To protect his privacy, Ill call him Bob.  Bob had reached what, for 
him, was a low point in his life.  Diagnosed with a brain tumor and suffering 
from epilepsy, he was struggling to cope with the physical debilitation and 
the uncertainty that attend serious medical problems.  To compound his 
troubles, he was facing daunting financial bills, and he had been denied a 
promised job promotion for which he had long worked. 
Then Bob attended the Walk to Emmaus, a three-day spiritual retreat.  
Although Bob had been attending worship services at his church each week 
for years and led a small group from his church that met every other week, 
the Walk to Emmaus was a spiritual experience for him like none other.  
With its nonstop, God-centered focus, he was able to step back from his lifes 
travails, see those travails from a new perspective, and gain the strength to 
endure and surmount the challenges he currently was confronting. 
Then there is Bethany.  Bethany recognized that her spiritual life had 
reached a plateau, but the ways commonly employed by others to reignite 
that spiritual spark for which she yearnedsuch as weekly communal 
worship, praying, or reading the Bible, Torah, Koran, or other religious 
workshad just not worked for her.  So she did something that was 
unconventional but, for her, spiritually needed.  She stayed at a convent 
where she could focus her attention exclusively on God.  And though not a 
Catholic herself, she found there the spiritual renewal and peace that she had 
not been able to find elsewhere. 
† Visiting Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law and University of Iowa 
College of Law; B.A., University of Illinois; J.D., University of Chicago Law School.  I would like to 
extend my thanks to my colleague John Dunsford for reviewing an earlier draft of this Article. 
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Both Bob and Bethany opted to experience what I have called an 
immersion approach to spirituality.1  They and others who have chosen to 
live for varying lengths of time in a communal environment in which a 
spiritual focus predominates have found that they need immersion-like 
experiences to charge or recharge their depleted or defunct spiritual batteries.  
Bob and Bethany also have said that they benefited not just spiritually, but 
physically, mentally, emotionally, and relationally, from what for them was a 
profound religious experience. 
But what about prisoners, who lack the freedom to leave prison and go to 
a place where they can obtain, along with others, the concentrated and 
sustained spiritual nourishment that they believe they need to grow 
spiritually or in other ways?  Can governmental officials afford prisoners 
these kinds of immersion-like experiences without abridging the First 
Amendments Establishment Clause?2  And, if they can, are governmentally 
funded faith-based prison units, which exemplify this immersion approach 
and are sometimes referred to as God pods,3 still inherently 
unconstitutional? 
In an article that I wrote several years ago, I contended that faith-based 
prison units subsidized by the government could be operated in conformance 
with the Establishment Clause.4  Although, since then, a federal district court 
has declared a faith-based unit in an Iowa prison to be unconstitutional,5 the 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has upheld that decision,6 and other 
challenges to faith-based units have been mounted across the country,7 I 
adhere to that conclusion. 
 1. Lynn S. Branham, “Go and Sin No More”: The Constitutionality of Governmentally Funded 
Faith-Based Prison Units, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 291, 316 (2004). 
 2. The First Amendment directs that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion.  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  This constitutional restriction also applies to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause.  Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985); see U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV. 
3. E.g., Wilson v. Moore, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 134041 (N.D. Fla. 2003). 
 4. Branham, supra note 1, at 30643. 
 5. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 432 F. Supp. 2d 
862, 934 (S.D. Iowa 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 509 F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 6. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 509 F.3d 406, 
42526 (8th Cir. 2007).  In this case, the Eighth Circuit, with Justice Sandra Day OConnor sitting by 
designation, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the lower court.  While the court 
of appeals held that the way in which the faith-based unit at issue in that case had been operated and 
funded violated the Establishment Clause, the court emphasized that the district courts injunction did not 
foreclose the state from contracting with providers of religious services and programs for prisoners, 
including organizations that operate faith-based units.  Id. at 428. 
 7. The Freedom From Religion Foundation (FFRF), for example, has filed lawsuits challenging 
faith-based units in the federal prisons and in a womens prison run by the Corrections Corporation of 
America (CCA) under a contract with the state of New Mexico.  See Freedom From Religion 
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In Part I of this Article, I explore the potential significance of several 
Supreme Court cases decided since I first wrote on this topic.  In Part II, I 
discuss why conventional tests applied to Establishment Clause claims and 
the test generally applied to prisoners constitutional claims seem inapposite 
when examining the constitutionality of faith-based prison units.  Then, in 
Parts III and IV, I delve more fully into two key arguments, ones that I 
believe are red herrings, which have been asserted by those who clamor 
against the constitutionality of faith-based prison units: that prisoners 
participation in faith-based units inevitably is coerced and that these units 
invariably manifest a lack of governmental neutrality on religious matters in 
contravention of the Establishment Clause.  I conclude, as I have before, that 
if structured properly, faith-based units can pass constitutional muster. 
I. RECENT SUPREME COURT DEVELOPMENTS
Several recent Supreme Court cases potentially have some bearing on the 
question of the constitutionality of faith-based prison units.  Two cases that 
arose in the prison contextCutter v. Wilkinson 8 and Johnson v. 
California 9are particularly germane.  After demonstrating how the Supreme 
Court remains deeply split about the Establishment Clauses meaning and 
import, I discuss the Supreme Courts rulings and analyses in those two 
cases. 
A. A Court Divided 
If the adage that a house divided cannot stand were applied to the 
Supreme Courts ruminations on the Establishment Clause, the Court would 
be in a state of collapse.  Fifteen years ago, a well-known First Amendment 
expert, now a federal appellate judge, succinctly described the Supreme 
Courts Establishment Clause jurisprudence: It is a mess.10  It remains so. 
Like a Creole chef continually tinkering with his recipe for jambalaya 
and periodically returning to his original recipe, the Supreme Court continues 
Foundation, Recent Court Cases, http://ffrf.org/legal/legal2.php (last visited Jan. 24, 2008).  FFRF 
abandoned the latter lawsuit in 2007 after the federal district judge to whom the case was assigned 
indicated that he probably was going to dismiss the case on the grounds that the plaintiff lacked standing 
to contest the faith-based program at the CCA facility.  See Clare Hughes, Lawsuit Targeting Faith-Based 
Prison Program Becomes “Hein Fatality,”  ROUNDTABLE ON RELIGION & SOC. WELFARE POLY, July 10, 
2007, http://www.religion andsocialpolicy.org/news/article.cfm?id=6740.
 8. 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
 9. 543 U.S. 499 (2005). 
 10. Michael W. McConnell, Exchange, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 
120 (1992). 
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to vacillate as to how to assess whether an Establishment Clause violation 
has occurred.  One Establishment Clause test the Supreme Court has applied 
is known as the Lemon test.  The Court first articulated this test in 1971 in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, in which it held that the dissemination of certain state 
funds to parochial schools abridged the Establishment Clause.11  To pass 
muster under the three-pronged Lemon test as it was originally formulated, a 
statute or governmental program must have a secular purpose, have a 
principal or primary effect other than advancing or curtailing religion, and 
avoid excessive governmental entanglement with religion.12
The Court sporadically applies the Lemon test in Establishment Clause 
cases, inciting Justice Scalia to charge that the Court selectively applies or 
disregards the test depending on the outcome it wishes to reach in a case: 
When we wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke it; when we 
wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely.13  In 2005, a 
majority of the Supreme Court appeared to apply this test in McCreary 
County v. ACLU of Kentucky, concluding that the posting of the Ten 
Commandments in two county courthouses failed the tests first prong and 
consequently violated the Establishment Clause.14  But while stating that she 
joined the majority opinion, Justice OConnor seemed to apply a different 
test in her concurring opinion, one that the Court had applied in the past.15
This test, known as the endorsement test, essentially asks whether a 
reasonable observer would perceive that the government is endorsing 
religion or a religious practice.16
A hodgepodge of other Establishment Clause tests were enunciated in 
McCreary County and Van Orden v. Perry, a case decided the same day as 
 11. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 607 (1971). 
12. Id. at 61213. 
 13. Lambs Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted).  In Lamb’s Chapel, Justice Scalia likened the Lemon test 
to a ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being 
repeatedly killed and buried.  Id. at 398. 
 14. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 87071 (2005).  In his dissenting opinion in 
McCreary County, Justice Scalia charged that the Court had skewed the Lemon test in a way that made it 
even more objectionable.  Id. at 90003 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  He pointed out, for example, that while 
the Lemon test requires that governmental actions have a secular purpose, the Court now was demanding 
that the secular purpose be predominant.  Id. at 90102. 
15. Id. at 88185 (OConnor, J., concurring) (discussing governmental endorsement of religion or a 
religious practice).  The Court previously had applied the endorsement test in, for example, County of 
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 59293 (1989). 
 16. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 655 (2002).  Courts are to ascribe to this hypothetical 
reasonable observer an understanding of the history and context of the governmental action or 
program being challenged under the Establishment Clause.  Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 
U.S. 98, 119 (2001) (quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) 
(OConnor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
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McCreary County in which the Supreme Court this time upheld the 
constitutionality of a display of the Ten Commandments on public 
property.17  Perhaps most notably, the majority in McCreary County 
acknowledged that there are special instances when the Establishment 
Clause condones governmental actions whose evident purpose is 
presumably religious.18  In Van Orden, Justice Thomas advocated that 
coercion should be the touchstone for Establishment Clause analyses,19
while Justice Scalia, in McCreary County, insisted that the Establishment 
Clause only prohibits the government from favoring one religious sect over 
another in certain circumstances, and not religion over irreligion.20  And 
Justice Breyer essentially threw up his hands, stating in Van Orden, I see no 
test-related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment.21
One need go no further into this jurisprudential thicket to understand that 
Establishment Clause law is in flux.  And to add to the uncertainty about how 
the Supreme Court will interpret this constitutional provision in the future, 
the composition of the Court has changed since McCreary County and Van 
Orden were decided.22  This has led one preeminent scholar to predict that 
we are about to witness a radical change in the law of the Establishment 
Clause.23
B. Two Pertinent Prison-Related Cases 
1. Cutter v. Wilkinson
The Supreme Court decided another Establishment Clause case in 2005, 
one of import to the question of the constitutionality of faith-based prison 
units.  The issue before the Court in that case, Cutter v. Wilkinson, was 
whether Congress had transgressed the boundaries of the Establishment 
 17. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005). 
18. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 859 n.10. 
19. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 697 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
20. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 88594 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  While Justice Scalia agreed that 
the government cannot show favoritism towards any religious sect when dispensing funds or other 
assistance to religion, he opined that public references by the government to a Creator could be 
monotheistic without violating the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 89394. 
21. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 22. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have now joined the Court, replacing former Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice OConnor. 
 23. Erwin Chemerinsky, Essay, Why Separate Church and State?, 85 OR. L. REV. 351, 352 (2006). 
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Clause by enacting the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(RLUIPA).24
The section of RLUIPA at issue in Cutter provides enhanced protections 
to prisoners religious liberty, greater than those afforded by the Constitution.  
According to the Supreme Court, the First Amendments Free Exercise 
Clause, which generally prohibits governmental incursions on religious 
freedom,25 permits prison officials to take actions that inhibit prisoners 
exercise of their religion as long as the actions are reasonably related to a 
legitimate penological interest[].26  But RLUIPA goes much further than 
this constitutional minimum in accommodating prisoners exercise of their 
religion, prohibiting governments from imposing any substantial burden on 
prisoners or other institutionalized persons exercise of their religion unless 
the burden is justified by a compelling governmental interest that is being 
furthered through the least restrictive means.27
The Supreme Court unanimously held in Cutter  that RLUIPA was 
constitutional on its face.28  The Court cited the fact that RLUIPA relieves 
what the Court considered exceptional government-created burdens on 
private religious exercise as the [f]oremost factor underlying its 
conclusion.29  The Court also emphasized that RLUIPA does not accord 
preferential treatment to any sect.30  Finally, the Court underscored that 
RLUIPA neither permits nor requires courts to ignore the burdens that a 
requested accommodation would place on others.31
While the Supreme Court said in Cutter that the burdens on others 
ensuing from a religious accommodation provided to a prisoner must factor 
into a courts assessment of whether RLUIPA, as applied, contravenes the 
Establishment Clause, the Court took care to distinguish between the 
imposition of burdens on others and the extension of benefits to them.  
Significantly, the Court said that just because the government has afforded 
some prisoners a religious accommodation does not mean that parallel 
 24. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 71213 (2005) (citing Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2000)). 
 25. The First Amendment provides in part that Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free 
exercise [of religion].  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  Because this constitutional provision implicitly is part of 
the due process afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment, it operates as a constraint on the states as well.  
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); see  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 26. OLone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). 
28. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 714, 725. 
29. Id. at 720. 
30. Id. at 720, 72324. 
31. Id. at 720, 72223. 
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secular benefits have to be extended to other prisoners.32  The Court 
recognized that, otherwise, most religious accommodations would flout the 
Establishment Clause.33  To illustrate its point, the Court noted that prison 
officials permit inmates to engage in congregate worship, but not to meet 
together for political rallies.34  In addition, the government pays for prison 
chaplains but not for other individuals, like political consultants, who could 
help inmates develop and express their nonreligious First Amendment-
related interests and views.35
The Supreme Court also rebuffed the argument that RLUIPA 
unconstitutionally promotes religion by encouraging prisoners to get 
religion in order to enjoy the benefits of a religious accommodation.36
The Court observed that it was dubious that inmates necessarily would 
perceive a religious accommodation as a benefit.37  In citing, as an 
example, the very bland kosher diet that one prison system provided certain 
prisoners at each meal day after day,38 the Court acknowledged the sacrifices 
and drawbacks that can attend the receipt of a religious accommodation. 
In an important caveat, the Court added that even if certain religious 
accommodations are indeed benefits, prisoners often receive such 
accommodations in any event, separate and apart from RLUIPAs dictates.39
The Free Exercise Clause, for example, mandates certain religious 
accommodations.  Thus, RLUIPA itself does not inexorably promote religion 
in a way that violates the Establishment Clause.  And as Cutter makes clear, 
there is nothing untoward or inherently unconstitutional in the government 
taking steps to meet prisoners religious needs even if those steps would be 
forbidden by the Establishment Clause if taken in the outside world.  The 
Supreme Court indicated, for example, that a state can constitutionally 
provide prisoners with a chaplain to help meet their spiritual needs.40  Yet it 
would be a palpable violation of the Establishment Clause if the government 
were to employ chaplains to provide religious services to the everyday 
populace. 
32. Id. at 72425.  Specifically, the Court affirmed that [r]eligious accommodations . . . need not 
come packaged with benefits to secular entities.  Id. at 724 (quoting Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987)). 
33. Id.
34. Id. at 72425. 
35. Id. at 724. 




40. See id. at 724. 
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2. Johnson v. California
The reasonable relationship test alluded to earlier, under which a 
restriction on a prisoners exercise of religion must be reasonably related to 
a legitimate penological interest to comport with the First Amendments 
Free Exercise Clause, is known as the Turner test.41  The Supreme Court 
has applied this test to an array of other constitutional claims of prisoners, 
including those invoking the constitutional rights to have access to the 
courts,42 to marry,43 and to associate with others,44 the First Amendment 
right to freedom of speech,45 and the due process right not to be forced to 
take antipsychotic medication.46  In fact, the Court once said that the Turner
test, a test under which it is exceedingly difficult for prisoners to prevail on a 
constitutional claim, is to be applied to all circumstances in which the needs 
of prison administration implicate constitutional rights.47
In Johnson v. California,48 another case decided in 2005, the Supreme 
Court confronted the implications of this all-encompassing statement and, 
some might argue, blinked.  In that case, the California Department of 
Corrections (CDC) had instituted a policy, though unwritten, of 
segregating prisoners by race for up to sixty days while they were being 
processed into a new prison.49  The CDC had adopted this policy in an effort 
to quell the violence between racial gangs that had plagued the prison 
system.50  While prison officials were obtaining information about new 
prisoners and determining which prisoners were threats to whom, prisoners 
would not be housed with other prisoners who posed what the prison officials 
believed to be an undue risk of harm to them. 
The Supreme Court did not decide whether this temporary segregation of 
prisoners based on their race violated their constitutional right to be afforded 
the equal protection of the law.  Instead, the Court addressed what test should 
be applied, on remand, by the district court.  Asserting that the Turner test 
was inapposite, the Court held that the traditional test applied to racial 
 41. The Supreme Court first articulated this test in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). 
 42. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 34647, 36162 (1996). 
43. Turner, 482 U.S. at 9799. 
 44. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 13235 (2003). 
 45. Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 257578 (2006); Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 22831 
(2001); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 40304 (1989); Turner, 482 U.S. at 9193. 
 46. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 22427 (1990). 
47. Id. at 224 (emphasis added). 
 48. 543 U.S. 499 (2005). 
49. See id. at 502. 
50. Id.
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classifications should apply in the prison context as well.51  Under this strict 
scrutiny test, a racial classification both must further a compelling govern-
mental interest and be narrowly tailored to meet that objective.52
In an effort to explain why the Turner test did not apply to the equal 
protection claim before it, the Supreme Court stated: [W]e have applied 
Turner s reasonable-relationship test only to rights that are inconsistent with 
proper incarceration.53  But that statement is a classic non sequitur.  In the 
past, the Supreme Court has examined whether the recognition of an asserted 
constitutional right in the prison context would conflict with legitimate 
penological objectives, and to what extent, as part of its analysis of whether 
the right exists.  For example, the Turner test itself requires that there be a 
valid, rational connection between a restriction on a constitutional right 
and the legitimate governmental interest that purportedly justifies the 
restriction.54  The test then requires a court to incorporate three other factors 
into its constitutional analysis, including the impact that accommodation of 
the right will have on other inmates, correctional staff, and prison 
resources.55
The essential point is that a rights relationship to the legitimate 
governmental interests that undergird proper incarceration has had a 
significant bearing on whether a court will find that the right survives 
incarceration.  As the Supreme Court said in Pell v. Procunier, [A] prison 
inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his 
status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the 
corrections system.56  But the asserted rights relationship to legitimate 
governmental interests, or what the Court referred to in Johnson as proper 
incarceration,57 has not governed what test is to be applied to a prisoners 
constitutional claim.  In other words, the demands of proper incarceration 
have affected the rights prisoners have, not the selection of the test employed 
in assessing the scope of those rights. 
This is not to say that the Supreme Court was incorrect in holding that a 
strict scrutiny test should apply to the segregation policy being challenged on 
equal protection grounds.  But it does mean that the Courts rationale for 
51. Id. at 509. 
52. Id.
53. Id. at 510 (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003)). 
 54. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
55. Id. at 9091.  The two other factors weighed under the Turner test are, first, the extent to which 
prisoners have alternative ways of exercising the right in question and, second, whether alternative means 
exist to further the legitimate penological interest to which the challenged restriction is linked.  Id.
 56. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). 
57. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 510. 
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deeming the Turner  test inapplicable in Johnson was, in my opinion, 
unfounded.58
The reason why Johnson has warranted mentioning in this Article is that 
it confirms that, despite the Courts earlier pronouncement to the contrary, 
the Turner test does not apply to all circumstances in which the needs of 
prison administration implicate constitutional rights.59  Although the 
Supreme Court has not yet announced, in my opinion, a principled basis for 
determining when the Turner  test will apply and when it will not, it is 
evident from Johnson that the Court will not always apply this watered-down 
constitutional test to prisoners claims.  The question, then, is whether a 
traditional Establishment Clause test, the Turner test, or some other test 
applies when assessing the constitutionality of faith-based prison units, a 
question to which this Article now turns. 
II. ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FAITH-BASED PRISON
UNITS: THE INAPPLICABILITY OF CONVENTIONAL TESTS
A. Traditional Establishment Clause Tests 
In determining whether faith-based prison units can be constitutional 
and, if so, whether a particular unit is being operated in conformance with the 
Establishment Clause, the threshold question is which test to apply when 
making that assessment.  It is evident, in my opinion, that the Lemon test is 
inapposite in this context, even if it somehow endures in the future.  In Cutter 
v. Wilkinson, the Supreme Court notably failed to apply the Lemon test when 
considering whether RLUIPA violated the Establishment Clause.60  This 
decision made inimitable sense because the Lemon test, which proscribes 
 58. In his dissenting opinion in Johnson, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, castigated the 
inconsistency-with-proper-prison-administration test for another reason.  Id. at 541 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Thomas noted that allowing the demands of proper incarceration to determine 
whether the Turner  test applies to a prisoners constitutional claim will require a court to decide what 
proper incarceration is, a task for which it is ill-equipped and one that is at odds with the traditional 
deference courts accord correctional officials assessments of penological needs.  Id. at 54142. 
 59. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990).  The Supreme Court also has not applied the 
Turner  test to prisoners Eighth Amendment claims and those invoking the right to procedural due 
process.  See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (holding that a prisoner, who alleged that 
he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment when prison officials failed to protect him from being 
attacked by another inmate, must prove that the officials acted with deliberate indifference to a 
substantial risk of serious harm, with no reference to the Turner test); Harper, 494 U.S. at 225, 22835 
(applying the Turner test to a prisoners substantive, but not his procedural, due process claim). 
60. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 726 n.1 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the 
Court correctly had refrained from applying the discredited Lemon test). 
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governmental actions whose principal effect is to advance religion,61 would 
bar prison officials from taking the sundry steps they commonly take to 
accommodate prisoners religious preferences and needs, including the hiring 
of prison chaplains and the provision of meals to prisoners that accord with 
their religious precepts. 
It is likewise questionable that the Supreme Court would apply the 
endorsement test when analyzing the constitutionality of faith-based prison 
units, although I believe that these units can be operated in a way that meets 
this test if it were deemed applicable.62  With the new composition of the 
Court, the circumstances under which, if at all, this test will be applied, even 
outside the prison setting, are less than clear.  But in any event, Cutter did 
not even allude to this test, likely because the Court recognized that when the 
government incarcerates a person, it imposes exceptional government-
created burdens on private religious exercise.63  In other words, the Court in 
Cutter in effect may have been acknowledging that governmental actions 
taken to meet prisoners religious needs and preferences represent one of 
those special instances when the construct for interpreting the 
Establishment Clause departs from the norm.64
B. The Turner Test 
The question, then, is what the appropriately tailored Establishment 
Clause test is that reflects the reality that the government can, and sometimes 
must, take steps to eradicate or limit the heavy burdens it has placed on 
prisoners exercise of their religionsteps that it could not take 
constitutionally in the free world.  The test that courts typically, though not 
always, apply to prisoners constitutional claims is the Turner  test, which 
often allows for the evisceration of what, in the outside world, would be a 
constitutional right.65
 61. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 61213 (1971). 
 62. As mentioned earlier in this Article, the pertinent query under the endorsement test is whether a 
reasonable observer would construe the governments actions as an endorsement of religion or a 
religious practice.  Courts attribute to the reasonable observer an understanding of the history and 
context of the governmental actions being challenged.  See supra note 16 and accompanying text.  Since 
a reasonable observer would be aware of the obstacles incarcerated individuals face in practicing their 
religion, the observer would not, in my opinion, interpret the governments efforts to mitigate the adverse 
effects of its own decisions to deprive people of their liberty as placing the governments imprimatur on 
religion. 
63. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720. 
64. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859 n.10 (2005); supra text 
accompanying note 18. 
65. See supra text accompanying notes 4147. 
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As mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court observed in Johnson that the 
Turner  test applies only to rights that are inconsistent with proper 
incarceration.66  While this statement, as noted previously, seems to 
confuse the constitutional test to be applied in a case with the outcome of that 
tests application, it suggests that when determining whether the Turner test 
applies to prisoners Establishment Clause claims, the Supreme Court would 
examine or attempt to examine whether the right to not be subjected to an 
establishment of religion conflicts with proper incarceration. 
The Supreme Court indicated in Johnson that a right is inconsistent with 
proper incarceration, triggering application of the Turner  test, if the right 
need necessarily be compromised for the sake of proper prison 
administration.67  So the question is whether the constitutional right 
protected by the Establishment Clause must, in the words of the Court, 
necessarily be compromised for the sake of proper prison administration.68
If, by proper prison administration, the Court is referring to institutional 
security needs, the answer to this question is no.  In my opinion, there is no 
inherent discord between, on the one hand, protecting the safety of prisoners, 
staff, and the public and the general security of a correctional institution and, 
on the other hand, refraining from promoting religion in a way that, outside 
the confines of a prison, would constitute governmental establishment of a 
religion.  To the contrary, one can envision how a failure to enforce the 
Establishment Clause in a prison could imperil institutional security.  Simply 
imagine the havoc that would ensue if prison officials were to mandate that 
all prisoners must participate in Christian worship services, Muslim services, 
or the services of some other religious sect. 
There is another reason, though, why proper prison administration 
necessitates the contraction of the Establishment Clauses scope in the prison 
setting.  After stating in Johnson that a rights incompatibility with proper 
incarceration is the criterion for divining the Turner tests applicability, the 
Supreme Court recited a quotation from an earlier case: [A] prison inmate 
retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status 
as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections 
system.69
One certainly could argue that the undiluted application of the 
Establishment Clause in the prison context is inconsistent with an inmates 
 66. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510 (2005) (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 
131 (2003)). 
67. Id. at 510.  An example of such a right is the right to freedom of association. 
68. Id.
69. Id. (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)) (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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status as a prisoner, making the Turner  test the litmus test for prisoners 
Establishment Clause claims.70  As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, 
the government appropriately can, and sometimes must, take steps to 
alleviate the exceptional government-created burdens on private religious 
exercise suffered by prisoners.71  But if the Establishment Clause, at least as 
the Supreme Court often has construed it, were applied with full force in 
prisons, prisoners constitutional right and ability to exercise their religion 
would or could be vapid indeed, as the Supreme Court seemed to recognize 
in Cutter.72  Prison officials, for example, certainly would not be able to 
expend government funds to build chapels in which prisoners congregate for 
worship, and government officials would be barred from taking many other 
steps commonly undertaken in prisons, steps that admittedly advance 
religion.73
Even though an argument can be crafted, based on the proper-
incarceration standard enunciated in Johnson, that the Turner test should 
govern prisoners Establishment Clause claims, the Turner  test is, at most, 
the starting point for a courts constitutional analysis.74  I say at most 
 70. The fact that courts apply the Turner  test to prisoners religious claims under the Free Exercise 
Clause provides additional support, at least at first glance, for applying the same test to their 
Establishment Clause claims.  As I have noted before, Since the Free Exercise Clause and the 
Establishment Clause share a commonality of purposeto protect religious libertyassigning preeminent 
value to the Establishment Clause seems discordant, not in keeping with the overarching goal of what one 
would assume should be complimentary, not conflicting, constitutional provisions.  Branham, supra note 
1, at 305.  I previously have concluded though, and reaffirm in this Article, that the Turner test could be, 
at most, the starting point for a courts constitutional analysis.  See id. at 322 (noting that compulsory 
assignments of prisoners to faith-based units clearly would violate the Establishment Clause even if 
they pass muster under the Turner test); infra text following note 78 (underscoring that if the Turner test 
is applied when assessing the constitutionality of faith-based units, it will not and cannot be the end-all of 
the Courts analysis). 
71. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005).  The government must take those steps when 
mandated to do so by the Free Exercise Clause.  See  Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972) (noting that 
prison officials must afford prisoners reasonable opportunities to practice their religion).  But the 
Supreme Court has made it crystal clear that correctional officials can take actions to accommodate 
prisoners religious interests and practices even when they are not constitutionally entitled to such an 
accommodation.  As the Court observed in Cutter, there is room for play in the joints between the Free 
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause, allowing correctional officials to take steps beyond those 
required by the Free Exercise Clause to facilitate inmates exercise of their religion without encroaching 
on other inmates right not to be subjected to a governmental establishment of religion.  Cutter, 544 U.S. 
at 713 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
72. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 71314. 
 73. For the results of a survey on the different kinds of faith-based programs available in each 
states prisons and the facilities utilized to offer those programs, see Survey Summary: Faith-Based 
Programming, CORRECTIONS COMPENDIUM, Aug. 2003, at 8, 1015 tbls.1 & 2. 
 74. Branham, supra note 1, at 306, 32122.  In my previous article on faith-based prison units, I 
concluded that faith-based units, if properly planned, could meet the Turner test if it were the governing 
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because, for several reasons, it is entirely possible that the Supreme Court 
will not apply the Turner test as even the threshold part of its analysis of the 
constitutionality of faith-based prison units.  First, as noted earlier, the 
Courts explication of when it will and will not apply the Turner  test, in my 
opinion, confuses two questions: when should the Turner  test apply and what 
should be the result when the test is applied in a particular case?75
Consequently, it now is much more difficult to predict with confidence when 
the Supreme Court will apply the Turner  test. 
Second, as discussed earlier in this Article, the Supreme Courts 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence currently is, to put it charitably, in 
disarray.76  It therefore is difficult to gauge which Establishment Clause test 
the Court will apply in any given case. 
Finally, in Cutter, the Supreme Court did not even allude to, much less 
apply, the Turner test when assessing whether RLUIPA violates the 
Establishment Clause.  Instead, the Court simply highlighted three factors 
underlying its conclusion that RLUIPA is constitutional on its face: one, that 
it relieves exceptional government-created burdens on private religious 
exercise; two, that courts applying RLUIPA must consider the burdens that 
a religious accommodation has on other prisoners who are not recipients of 
the accommodation; and three, that the benefits accorded prisoners by 
RLUIPA extend to prisoners of all faiths.77  Since RLUIPA extends 
protections to prisoners and has an impact on prison operations, it is possible 
that the Supreme Court would replicate the somewhat diffuse Establishment 
Clause analysis seen in Cutter  in a case challenging the constitutionality of 
faith-based prison units on Establishment Clause grounds.  But if the Court 
were to do so, my conclusion that faith-based units can comport with the 
Establishment Clause would not vary.78
Regardless of what role, if any, the Turner  test would play in the 
Supreme Courts analysis of the constitutionality of faith-based prison units, 
it will not and cannot be the end-all of the Courts analysis.  Otherwise, even 
involuntary transfers to such units would be constitutional as long as 
compelled participation in the activities of the units had the requisite 
reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental interest, such as 
test.  In other words, the units are reasonably related to multiple legitimate penological interests.  Id.
at 322. 
75. See supra text accompanying notes 5357. 
76. See supra Part I.A. 
77. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 72024. 
78. See infra Part IV.B.2 for a discussion of the burdens accompanying the operation of these 
units, and infra Part IV.C for a discussion of the requirement that the government manifest neutrality 
between religious sects when establishing faith-based units. 
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recidivism reduction.  But such coerced participation in worship and other 
religious practices is a paradigmatic violation of the Establishment Clause, as 
even those who most narrowly interpret the Establishment Clauses scope 
would concede. 
Because prisoners unforced participation in faith-based units is an 
elementary prerequisite to their constitutionality, this Article will now flesh 
out further the import of this constitutional requirement.  The specific 
question addressed below is whether inmates participation in faith-based 
prison units is inevitably coerced, as some opponents of these units contend. 
III. COERCION IN THE PRISON SETTING: AN AMPLIFICATION
Requiring prisoners, against their free will, to pray to Allah five times a 
day, take communion, or read the Torah would patently violate the 
Establishment Clause, as most everyone would agree.  Some critics of faith-
based prison units have suggested that the units, particularly those whose 
operations are subsidized by government funds, similarly coerce prisoners to 
participate in religious activities.  I profoundly disagree. 
At the heart of these critics arguments is skepticism that prisoners can 
exercise true private choice79 in the inherently coercive environment of a 
prison.80  But this sentiment flies in the face of both the law and logic. 
A. The Law 
The Establishment Clause is not the only constitutional provision that 
places limits on governmental coercion of individuals.  The Due Process 
Clauses, for example, prohibit governmental officials from extracting 
involuntary confessions from suspected criminals.81  Yet the Supreme Court 
has long held, and other courts have concurred, that confinement does not 
abnegate the voluntariness of a confession.82  In other words, a person can be 
 79. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002) ([We] have never found a program of 
true private choice to offend the Establishment Clause.). 
80. See Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 432 F. Supp. 
2d 862, 922 (S.D. Iowa 2006) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 509 F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding that 
prisons are inherently coercive environments); Katerina Semyonova, Note, In the Big House with the 
Good Book: An Examination of the Constitutionality of Faith-Based Prisons, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 209, 
232 (2005) (concluding that no true choice can be made by prisoners in this context). 
 81. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (construing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV). 
 82. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558 (1897) ([I]t has been settled that the mere fact that 
the confession is made to a police officer, while the accused was under arrest in or out of prison, or was 
drawn out by his questions, does not necessarily render the confession involuntary . . . .); United States v. 
Larry, 126 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding a statement to the police made after police promised 
to release the defendant from jail to be voluntary); Dallio v. Spitzer, 170 F. Supp. 2d 327, 33940 
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incarcerated and yet make a confession considered a product of his or her 
free and unconstrained choice.83  In addition, whether confined or not 
confined, individuals can be subjected to significant pressures to confess 
without necessarily vitiating the voluntariness of the confession.84
The contention that the pressures of confinement annihilate free will also 
is belied by the frequency with which courts accept guilty pleas from 
incarcerated individuals.  One of the prerequisites to the entry of a valid 
guilty plea is that it be voluntary.85  Yet the Supreme Court never has hinted 
that incarceration produces actual or threatened physical harm or mental 
coercion overbearing the will of the defendant, rendering a guilty plea 
involuntary.86  In fact, the Supreme Court has held that even a guilty plea 
entered to avoid the death penalty can be voluntary.87  Thus, incarceration 
does not negate the free will of individuals to make decisions that preserve 
their lives, limit the length of prison sentences, or enable them to avoid 
further incarceration entirely if a guilty plea leads to the imposition of a 
community-based sanction.  It would seem discordant, then, to conclude that 
incarceration per se makes it much more likely or even somewhat likely that 
a decision to be confined in a particular part of a prisona faith-based unit
is coerced and invalid as an involuntary act.88
The Supreme Courts decision in McKune v. Lile confirms that a 
prisoners choice to live in a particular prison or unit of a prison can be 
uncoerced from a constitutional standpoint.89  That case concerned the 
constitutionality of requiring a prisoner, a convicted sex offender, to make 
some potentially inculpatory admissions and disclosures as a precondition to 
being admitted into a Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (SATP).  
Specifically, the prisoner had to admit that he had committed the sex crime 
of which he had been convicted.90  In addition, the prisoner had to recount 
(E.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d on other grounds, 343 F.3d 553, 564 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that confession of 
ris
 303 (1991) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Culombe 
 C
r falsely told defendant that the person with whom he had committed 
0 (describing the coercion necessary to render a guilty plea involuntary). 
. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002). 
t 30. 
p oner interrogated by two police officers was voluntary).
 83. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,
v. onnecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)). 
84. See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737, 739 (1969) (finding defendants confession 
voluntary even though police office
the murder already had confessed). 
 85. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 (1970). 
86. See id. at 75
87. Id. at 755. 
88. See id. at 750. 
 89. McKune v
90. Id. a
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his 
lation that the prisoner had 
com
portunities and visitation rights, reduced pay for prison work, and 
rest
nit, as in McKune, 
typically will be much greater than the differences between the conditions in 
a faith-based unit and a prisons general-population unit.98
sexual history, including sex crimes with which he had not been 
charged.91
The plaintiff in McKune, a convicted sex offender, contended that these 
admission requirements compelled prisoners like him to incriminate 
themselves, in violation of the Fifth Amendment.92  An admission that a 
prisoner had committed the crime for which he was serving time in prison, 
for example, could lead to a prosecution for perjury if he had denied 
committing the crime at trial.93  And the reve
mitted sex crimes with which he had never been charged might lead to 
the filing of criminal charges for those crimes.94
The Supreme Court rebuffed this Fifth Amendment claim even though 
prison officials were exerting considerable pressure on the plaintiff to 
comply with the SATPs entry requirements.  The officials had told the 
plaintiff that if he failed to fill out the Admission of Responsibility and 
sexual-history forms, they would transfer him from a medium-security unit to 
a maximum-security unit.95  There he would be confined in a cell with three 
other people rather than one, would be unable to leave his cell as much as he 
could in the medium-security unit, and would be living in what the Court 
recognized was a potentially more dangerous environment.96  In addition, 
he would suffer a considerable diminution of privileges, including curtailed 
job op
rictions on what he could buy in the prison commissary and keep in his 
cell.97
It would be odd, in my opinion, to conclude that exerting such great 
pressures on a prisoner to make inculpatory admissions does not constitute 
compulsion but that a prisoners decision to live in a faith-based unit 
invariably must be considered unconstitutionally coerced.  And such an 
unfounded conclusion would be particularly paradoxical since the differences 
between conditions in a medium- and maximum-security u
91. Id.
92. Id. at 29. 
93. Id. at 55 & n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 3031 (plurality opinion). 
96. Id. at 31. 
97. Id.
98. Compare id. (listing the differences in confinement conditions between maximum- and medium-
security units), with infra Part IV.B (describing the differences in conditions between faith-based units and 
other prison units). 
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B. Logic 
I stated earlier that the contention that prisoners cannot make a true 
private choice whether to live in a faith-based unit is also illogical.  Here is 
why. 
Government-paid chaplains are commonplace in prisons (as well as in 
the military), but employing them to compensate for the burdens 
incarceration (or military service) imposes on the exercise of religion clearly 
is constitutional.99  If a chaplain teaches a Bible-study class to prisoners, the 
Establishment Clause is not impinged, because it is constitutional to alleviate 
these burdens and because, as the Supreme Court has observed, the link 
between government funds and religious training is broken by the 
independent and private choice of recipients.100  Likewise, the independent 
and private choice of prisoners obviates any Establishment Clause problems 
when a chaplain prays with them, administers sacraments to them, or 
provides them with counseling services with a religious perspective. 
In addition to chaplains, prisons commonly have chapels as well as other 
places whose primary purpose is to enable inmates to worship and engage in 
other religious practices.101  Some prisons, for example, have erected sweat 
lodges to accommodate the religious practices of Native American 
inmates.102  None of these places of meditation and worship, which often are 
built and operated with government funds, abridge the Establishment Clause, 
in part because only prisoners exercising their independent and private 
choice frequent them. 
If the pressures that attend incarceration do not disable prisoners from 
freely and voluntarily deciding to avail themselves of the religious services 
provided by prison chaplains or to spend some time in a religious setting, it is 
difficult to comprehend how freedom of choice is not tenable when 
prisoners are deciding whether to apply for admission into a faith-based 
unit.103  To aver that prisoners are incapacitated from making a true private 
99. E.g., Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 234 (2d Cir. 1985) (military chaplains); Theriault v. 
Silber, 547 F.2d 1279, 1280 (5th Cir. 1977) (prison chaplains); cf. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 
72425 (2005) (observing that under the Sixth Circuits approach to religious accommodations, an 
approach with which the Supreme Court disagreed, even the employment of prison chaplains would be 
unconstitutional). 
 100. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 719 (2004). 
101. Survey Summary: Faith-Based Programming, supra note 73, at 1013 tbl.1. 
102. See Susan Montoya Bryan, Sweating Out the Demons in Prison: Native Americans Allowed to 
Participate in Religious Rites, WASH. POST, June 17, 2007, at A7; Jana Hollingsworth, Imprisoned 
Religion, DULUTH NEWS-TRIB., Jan. 12, 2008, 2008 WLNR 682679. 
103. But see Semyonova, supra note 80, at 220 (criticizing courts for failing to consider whether free 
choice is truly tenable in prisons). 
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choice whether to reside in such a unit betrays, in my opinion, what Justice 
Scalia has lamented as a trendy disdain for deep religious conviction:104 as 
long as a prisoner opts for what, for him, may be religion lite, there is no 
Establishment Clause problem.  But if he seeks to deepen his faith by living 
in a faith-based unit, unconstitutional coercion appears. 
Opponents of faith-based prison units still might claim that they are 
distinguishable from other religious programs and services, like prison 
chaplains.  The crux of their argument likely would be that the benefits of 
living in faith-based units, unlike the benefits of other faith-based programs, 
are so great that the pressures to live in them are overwhelming and 
irresistible. 
The fact that many prisoners eligible to live in faith-based units choose 
not to belies this contention,105 as does the reality that many inmates who 
live in the units decide to withdraw from these faith-based residential 
programs.106  But in addition to these indicators of the fallacy that prisoners 
inexorably are compelled to live in faith-based prison units, McKune, as 
mentioned earlier, stands as a powerful rebuttal to the argument that the 
differences in the living conditions in a faith-based unit unconstitutionally 
skew prisoners decisions to live in such a unit.107
C. School Prayers and Faith-Based Prison Units: A False Analogy 
Some opponents of faith-based prison units claim that a line of Supreme 
Court cases condemning, on Establishment Clause grounds, certain collective 
prayers at schools and school events points to the unconstitutionality of faith-
based prison units.108  The analogy is a false one. 
Lee v. Weisman 109 is the case these opponents most frequently cite.  In 
that case, the Supreme Court held that the recitation of nonsectarian prayers 
by a rabbi at a high school graduation contravened the Establishment 
Clause.110  The Court evinced a concern about the impressionability of youth 
104. Locke, 540 U.S. at 733 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
105. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY COUNCIL, INITIAL PROCESS AND OUTCOME EVALUATION 
OF THE INNERCHANGE FREEDOM INITIATIVE: THE FAITH-BASED PRISON PROGRAM IN TDCJ 9 tbl. (2003) 
(reporting that of 866 eligible inmates interviewed to live in a faith-based unit, 624 volunteered to do so). 
 106. A survey of prisoners who participated in the Federal Bureau of Prisons residential faith-based 
program found that six percent of them began the program but later withdrew from it voluntarily.  Scott D. 
Camp et al., An Exploration into Participation in a Faith-Based Program, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POLY
529, 541 tbl.1 (2006). 
107. See supra text accompanying notes 8998. 
108. E.g., Semyonova, supra note 80, at 229. 
 109. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
110. Id. at 599. 
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who, because of their age, might interpret the prayer as an attempt to 
employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy.111  The 
Court concluded that by including these prayers in the graduation ceremony, 
school officials were coercing students unconstitutionally to express their 
assent to these prayers by standing or at least remaining quiet during their 
recitation.112  And since graduation from high school is such a highlight of 
peoples lives, the Court was not persuaded that teenage graduates who were 
nonbelievers had a real choice to avoid participating in a religious practice 
that was antithetical to their own views by not attending graduation.113
For a number of reasons, faith-based prison units are unlike prayers 
publicly uttered at high school graduation ceremonies.  Three are most 
significant. 
First, the reason why the Supreme Court has been particularly vigilant 
in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and 
secondary schools114 does not apply to prisoners.  They are not children.  
They are adults, or they are considered mature enough to be punished as 
adults.  That does not mean that prison officials have the prerogative to pipe 
prayers, sectarian or otherwise, through a public-address system to prisoners, 
the quintessential captive audience.  But it does mean that the Supreme 
Courts asserted rationale for its heightened vigilance in the Establishment 
Clause school cases is inapplicable. 
Second, residence in a faith-based unit is unlike attendance at a high 
school graduation.  A graduation is the capstone of four years of (one hopes) 
hard work and is celebrated as a milestonea send-off of sorts for youth as 
they leave their parents nests.  Many people may not agree with the 
Supreme Courts conclusion in Lee that graduation prayers force students to 
engage in a religious practice.  But the Supreme Courts additional 
observation that students effectively are compelled to attend graduation 
ceremonies seems understandable, even though still debatable, due to the 
burdens that would ensue if the students stayed homethe loss of enjoying 
one of lifes major milestones with family members and friends. 
Living in a faith-based unit, by contrast, has none of the marks of such a 
milestone.  It is difficult then to comprehend how a prisoners application for 
a transfer to such a unit, analogous in some, though not all, ways to an 
application for a transfer to a prison closer to his home, is presumptively 
coerced, no matter what the facts.  While graduation may be, as the Supreme 
111. Id. at 592. 
112. Id. at 593. 
113. Id. at 595. 
 114. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691 (2005) (plurality opinion) (quoting Edwards v. 
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 58384 (1987)). 
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Court observed in Lee, an event of singular importance to every student,115
it cannot be said that living in a faith-based unit is of singular importance 
to every prisoner.  Some prisoners will want to live in such a unit, and others 
will not. 
A third factor distinguishes the prayers spoken at high school graduations 
and residence in a faith-based prison unit: the government does not subject 
students to the exceptional burdens on the exercise of their religion to 
which prisoners are subject.116  Thus, faith-based prison units and graduation 
prayers are not analogs, because some prisoners may want and need to 
overcome these unique burdens, to the extent possible, by living in faith-
based units.  Some of these prisoners may decide that they need to live with 
other prisoners who are seekers or believers in order to effectively 
commence what is often described as a spiritual journey.  Others may 
conclude that they need to live in an environment with an intense spiritual 
focus in order to deepen an already existing relationship with God.  Still 
others may believe that the only or best way that they can come to terms with 
their criminal pasts or realize their future potential is to examine and discuss 
with others, throughout each day and from a religious perspective, their 
errant pasts, their current thoughts and actions, and their hopes for the future. 
In sum, saying that the Supreme Courts conclusion that high school 
students have no real alternative to avoid graduation prayers117 means that 
prisoners have no real alternative to avoid faith-based units is an 
unfounded syllogism.  In addition, the cases discussing students rights under 
the Establishment Clause are inapposite in the prison context, because as 
mentioned before in this Article, government officials can, and sometimes 
must, take steps to accommodate prisoners religious practices that they 
would be barred from taking elsewhere, including in schools. 
IV. FAITH-BASED PRISON UNITS AND GOVERNMENTAL NEUTRALITY
Faith-based prison units raise another question to which this Article will 
now turn: whether they reflect governmental favoritism towards religion 
barred by the Establishment Clause.  The Establishment Clause obviously 
prohibits the government from preferring one religious sect over another, 
decreeing, for example, that everyone should adhere to the tenets of Judaism, 
Islam, or Christianity.  But Justices on the Supreme Court as well as First 
Amendment scholars have sparred about the extent to which the 
115. Lee, 505 U.S. at 598. 
116. See  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005). 
117. Lee, 505 U.S. at 598. 
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 defined. 
Establishment Clause also prohibits government officials from taking actions 
that favor, or appear to favor, religion over irreligion.  One commonly 
espoused view is that such a prohibition is embedded in the Establishment 
Clause.118  But Justice Scalia and others have castigated this view, arguing 
that it flouts the Establishment Clause by elevating a bland secularity over 
religiosity.119
The crux of this debate is whether broadly defined governmental 
neutrality on religious matters is even possible.120  This Article refrains 
from entering into this imbroglio, nor need it to ascertain that faith-based 
prison units can be planned and implemented in a way that meets the 
neutrality requirement, whether broadly or narrowly
A. The Establishment of Faith-Based Prison Units 
The Establishment Clause is not the only First Amendment provision that 
requires the government to be neutral on certain matters.  A content-
neutrality requirement, for example, is subsumed within the First 
Amendment right to freedom of speech.121  This requirement places 
constraints on the governments restriction of speech based on its content. 
The Supreme Court has held that withholding certain publications from 
prisoners can be neutral in the constitutional sense even though censorship 
decisions are based to some extent, on content.122  According to the Court, 
prison officials still act with the requisite neutrality when censoring 
communications with prisoners as long as their actions further an important 
or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of 
expression.123
118. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (reiterating that the 
First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality . . . between religion and nonreligion (quoting 
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968))); Chemerinsky, supra note 23, at 36162 (arguing that a 
core purpose of the Establishment Clause is to ensure that people who are irreligious, in addition to the 
adherents of all religions, feel included in society). 
119. E.g., McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 88594 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In McCreary County, 
Justice Scalia debunked what he termed the demonstrably false principle that government cannot favor 
religion over irreligion.  Id. at 893; see also Richard M. Esenberg, You Cannot Lose If You Choose Not to 
Play: Toward a More Modest Establishment Clause, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 56 (2006) 
(noting that courts efforts to avoid offending the irreligious are not religiously neutral, appearing 
instead to be a judicial mandate of public secularism). 
120. See Esenberg, supra note 119, at 67 (arguing that [c]omplete neutrality between religion and 
irreligion is unobtainable because a jurisprudence that defines government neutrality on religion as acting 
as if it did not exist will cause its religious citizens to feel excluded). 
 121. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Assn, 127 S. Ct. 2372, 2381 (2007) (affirming that a governmental 
restriction on speech based on its content is presumptively invalid). 
 122. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 415 (1989). 
123. Id. (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974)). 
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t acts.  
Similarly, because faith-based prison units further significant 
governmental interests unrelated to a partisan support for religion, their use 
does not necessarily, or even usually, reflect the lack of neutrality on 
religious matters that raises Establishment Clause concerns.  Some of these 
more significant interests are highlighted below. 
1. Reducing Recidivism 
One of the substantial governmental interests to which faith-based prison 
units are rationally linked is the interest in curbing recidivism.  This interest 
is of primal importance because the recidivism rates of released prisoners are 
currently so high.  Within three years after their release from prison, 
approximately two-thirds of ex-prisoners are rearrested, usually for a felony 
or serious misdemeanor.124  During this same time period, more than half of 
the former prisoners end up back in prison, whether for new crimes or for 
violations of their release conditions.125
A number of studies have examined the impact religiousness has on 
crime and delinquency.  Different data-collection methods can be used to 
measure a persons religiousness, such as monitoring the frequency with 
which people attend group worship services.126  But whatever method 
employed, most studies have found a negative correlation between 
religiousness and criminal or delinquent actions.127  In other words, it 
appears that religiousness inhibits the inclination or propensity of many 
people to commit crimes or delinquen 128
Some studies on faith-based prison units have concluded that they show 
promise in their potential to reduce recidivism.129  But the specific effects 
 124. PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, NCJ 193427, RECIDIVISM OF 
PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, at 1, 34 tbls.2 & 3 (2002). 
125. Id. at 1. 
 126. Colin J. Baier & Bradley R.E. Wright, “If You Love Me, Keep My Commandments”: A Meta-
Analysis of the Effect of Religion on Crime, 38 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 3, 13 (2001).  Another common 
way to measure religiousness is to ask people about their religious beliefs and the extent to which they 
perceive themselves as religious.  Id.
127. See BYRON R. JOHNSON ET AL., CTR. FOR RES. ON RELIGION & URB. CIV. SOCY, OBJECTIVE 
HOPE: ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
7, 1213 (2002), available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/crrucs _objective_hope.pdf; Baier & 
Wright, supra  note 126, at 16. 
 128. Studies on drug and alcohol abuse, often a prelude to criminal activity, have yielded similar 
results.  For example, the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse has reported that individuals 
who do not attend religious services are much more likely to binge drink and to use illicit drugs.  THE 
NATL CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE, SO HELP ME GOD: SUBSTANCE ABUSE, RELIGION AND 
SPIRITUALITY 2, 79 (2001). 
129. E.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 105, at 2324 (reporting that offenders 
who graduated from Prison Fellowship Ministries InnerChange Freedom Initiative (IFI) recidivated 
BRANHAM-THEDEVILISINTHEDETAILS.DOC 8/7/2008 8:32 AM 
432 AVE MARIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:2 
that faith-based prison units have on recidivism rates are, at this point, less 
than clear.  These faith-based programs still are in their infancy, so the data 
that have been collected about them are preliminary in nature.  In addition, 
concerns have been raised that the reported data have been skewed to show 
that the units are effective in reducing recidivism.130
For several reasons, however, the lack of definitive proof that faith-based 
prison units reduce recidivism does not undercut the validity of the point that 
prison officials can act with the requisite neutrality in establishing faith-
based prison units.  In other words, the officials preeminent motive in 
establishing these units still can be the strictly secular ones of reducing 
recidivism and finding more effective ways to do so. 
First, conclusive evidence of the efficacy of an innovative prison 
program never exists at its beginning.  Therefore, demanding that prison 
officials produce such evidence before or even soon after initiating a new 
program is to require the impossible, dooming prison officials efforts to 
potentially reduce recidivism through a cutting-edge faith-based program. 
Second, even if there were a consensus that the data collected thus far on 
faith-based prison units do not show that they have had the hoped-for impact 
on recidivism, that does not mean that these disappointing results would be 
replicated in the future.  It must be remembered that prison officials and the 
persons or entities with which they may contract to operate these units are 
still on the learning curve in designing these units operations to maximize 
their effectiveness.  So even if it were concluded that the first generation of 
faith-based prison units has not precipitated a decline in the commission of 
crimes by released prisoners, it is possible that these units may be 
reconfigured, based on what is learned about them, so that the next 
generation of faith-based units achieves or better achieves the goal of 
reducing recidivism. 
There is a third reason why the lack of unequivocal proof that faith-based 
prison units curb recidivism does not foreclose the interest in recidivism 
reduction from serving as an indicator of the governments neutrality in 
establishing these units.  The mass of studies showing an inverse relationship 
between religiousness and crime already provides the empirical foundation, 
at a significantly lower rate than comparison groups of inmates, including those who had volunteered for, 
but did not participate in, IFI and those who met IFIs selection criteria but did not participate in the 
program). 
130. E.g., Mark A.R. Kleiman, Faith-Based Fudging: How a Bush-Promoted Christian Program 
Fakes Success by Massaging Data, SLATE, Aug. 5, 2003, http://www.slate.com/id/ 2086617 (criticizing 
the statistics purportedly showing IFIs success in reducing recidivism as misleading, since to be 
considered a graduate of the program, participants had to have completed successfully both the in-prison 
and post-release portions of the program, including the requirement of securing employment upon 
release). 
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if one were needed, for concluding that in opening these units, prison 
officials are striving to advance the substantial, and indeed compelling, 
interest in averting future crimes.131  During the formative years in which 
these units are being created and calibrated, the results of these studies 
should be considered quantitative evidence of a neutral, nonsectarian reason 
for instituting these faith-based programs. 
2. Protecting Institutional Security 
Another interest of overriding importance that prison officials can cite 
when instituting faith-based prison units is the interest in protecting 
institutional security.  Prison officials are entrusted with the responsibilities 
of keeping inmates and staff safe and maintaining order and discipline in 
places where convicted felons, many of whom have committed murder, rape, 
robbery, and other violent crimes, reside.  In meeting the daunting challenges 
that attend these responsibilities, prison officials could rationally conclude 
that faith-based prison units may be effective tools to protect institutional 
security.  Much, though not all, of the inmate misconduct that can jeopardize 
institutional security is criminal in nature.  When prisoners kill, rape, assault, 
or steal from other inmates or correctional staff, intentionally damage others 
property, or use illegal drugs, they are committing crimes, as well as 
disciplinary infractions.  Consequently, the panoply of studies finding that 
religion is a persistent . . . inhibitor of adult crime132 provides empirical 
support for the augmentation of faith-based programming opportunities for 
prisoners for the purely secular reason of attempting to make prisons safer 
and more secure. 
Although there has been little research focusing specifically on the 
impact of religion on prisoners violation of prison rules, one of the more 
comprehensive analyses of this subject reported a statistically significant 
inverse relationship between confinement for disciplinary infractions and 
prisoners religiousness.133  Another study found that religiosity directly 
reduces the likelihood of arguments between prisoners and indirectly 
diminishes the likelihood that they will engage in physical fights.134
131. See supra notes 12728 and accompanying text. 
132. E.g., Byron R. Johnson et al., Religious Programs, Institutional Adjustment, and Recidivism 
Among Former Inmates in Prison Fellowship Programs, 14 JUST. Q. 145, 163 (1997). 
 133. Todd R. Clear & Melvina T. Sumter, Prisoners, Prison, and Religion: Religion and Adjustment 
to Prison, in RELIGION, THE COMMUNITY, AND THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS 127, 
14344 (Thomas P. OConnor & Nathaniel J. Pallone eds., 2002). 
 134. Kent R. Kerley et al., Religiosity, Religious Participation, and Negative Prison Behaviors, 44 J.
FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 443, 450, 453 (2005). 
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Research studies like these may provide independent empirical support for 
the nonsectarian goal of enhancing institutional security by affording inmates 
additional opportunities to develop spiritually, whether in faith-based units or 
through other faith-based programming. 
3. Accommodating Prisoners’ Exercise of Their Religion 
Even if studies were to determine definitively some day, after enough 
time has elapsed for the operations of faith-based prison units to be calibrated 
and refined based on research and experience, that faith-based prison units 
are ineffective in reducing recidivism or protecting institutional security, 
those research findings would not mean that, by continuing to operate these 
units, government officials are acting without the neutrality the 
Establishment Clause commands.  That is because government officials can 
take steps to accommodate prisoners religious needs and interests that they 
would be barred from taking in the outside world.  In other words, faith-
based prison units can be a legitimate means of meeting a third significant 
governmental interestthat of relieving or diminishing burdens the 
government itself has imposed on inmates ability to develop spiritually 
while they are incarcerated. 
Justice OConnor has said, It is disingenuous to look for a purely 
secular purpose when the manifest objective of a statute is to facilitate the 
free exercise of religion by lifting a government-imposed burden.135  In my 
opinion, it is not disingenuous to undertake this kind of inquiry when prison 
officials open faith-based units in an effort to reduce recidivism, enhance 
institutional security, or realize other secular ends.  But if, on the other hand, 
the units are opened to compensate for government-created obstacles to 
spiritual development and growth, prison officials do not need to scurry 
around and try to find secular goals to which they can point as rationales for 
this particular kind of faith-based program.  In fact, such feigning regarding 
the purpose for which a faith-based unit is added to the mix of programming 
options at a prison demeans the legitimacy and importance of the 
governmental interest in palliating the harm ensuing from the exceptional 
government-created burdens on private religious exercise in prisons, the 
same interest that underlay the Supreme Courts holding in Cutter that 
RLUIPA is not facially unconstitutional.136
 135. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985) (OConnor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
136. See  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005). 
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B. Conditions in Faith-Based Prison Units 
Although including a faith-based unit in a prison, in and of itself, does 
not evidence the lack of neutrality that contravenes the Establishment Clause, 
it is possible that conditions in the unit, compared to conditions in the 
prisons general population, or some other unit used as a benchmark for 
comparison, might show that the government is favoring religion in a way 
that the Establishment Clause forbids.  To give an extreme example to 
illustrate this point, if prisoners in a faith-based unit were served sumptuous 
meals of steak, lobster, and wine, slept in posh rooms with large brass beds, 
and could take private bubble baths each night, while prisoners in the general 
population were fed the standard and often unpalatable prison fare, slept in 
spartanly furnished rooms, and bathed in large shower rooms with a dozen 
other inmates, the differences in the prisoners conditions of confinement 
would be tantamount to an unofficial decree that prisoners should become 
more religious or join a particular religious sect. 
Some individuals who are highly critical of faith-based prison units have 
argued or intimated that inmates would have to be afforded an equally 
attractive alternative to confinement in a faith-based unit in order for it to be 
constitutional.137  For several reasons, I disagree. 
1. “Equal” Living Conditions—An Unworkable Standard 
First, requiring equality in conditions as the litmus test for neutrality 
would be to require the impossible.  For an array of legitimate and often 
unavoidable reasons, conditions in a faith-based unit might not mirror those 
in the general-population unit or some other unit with which the faith-based 
unit is being compared.  For example, the design and construction of a 
prisons units may foreclose such identical conditions.  Housing units 
frequently vary in the size of their cells or dormitory rooms, the amount of 
dayroom space, access to natural light, the location and number of toilets, 
sinks, and showers, age, and other significant and insignificant ways.  If 
faith-based units physical appearance must mimic that of other units, they 
rarely will get out of the programming gates at many prisons. 
Even if there are no differences in the units physical configuration, the 
units may house a different number of inmates, which in turn may have an 
impact on their day-to-day lives.  For example, a faith-based unit may house 
fewer prisoners than its general-population counterpart when inmates still are 
becoming aware of this faith-based program or demand for the program has 
 137. Semyonova, supra note 80, at 232. 
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shifted downwards, even though perhaps temporarily, due to natural 
fluctuations in the prison population.  And it bears noting that to require an 
absolute equivalence in the number of prisoners in both units might spawn, 
ironically, overly aggressive efforts to recruit prisoners to live in the faith-
based unit, efforts that could generate Establishment Clause concerns. 
A faith-based unit and the unit with which it is being compared also may, 
and likely will, differ in the number of volunteers providing services to 
prisoners.  Prisons typically are unable to attract enough volunteers to visit or 
mentor all of the inmates confined in the prison or to help them in other 
ways.  People often are afraid of prisoners and, in any event, are skeptical 
that their service work will bear much fruit with persons whom they perceive 
as incorrigible.  Individuals who are religious, however, may be more 
inclined to avail themselves of service opportunities in a faith-based unit, 
believing that their time with inmates who have manifested an interest in 
deep and sustained spiritual development likely will have a more positive, 
profound, and permanent effect on them.  In addition, prospective volunteers 
may feel safer with such inmates. 
There are myriad other ways in which a faith-based unit and a 
comparative unit may not be, for quite legitimate reasons, equally 
attractive in their conditions and operations.  Which brings me to the second 
reason why I disagree with those who espouse a constitutional need for such 
equivalence: such identity between units is not only impossible, it is 
unnecessary. 
2. “Equal” Living Conditions—A Rejected Standard 
In Cutter, the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that each step the 
government takes to compensate for the burdens that incarceration imposes 
on the exercise of religion must be matched by some parallel step to allay 
restrictions on secular interests.138  Religious accommodations, the Court 
observed, need not come packaged with benefits to secular entities.139
Thus, it is not inherently unconstitutional for Congress, through RLUIPA, to 
have required that a compelling interest test be met to justify incursions on 
prisoners religious practices, while restraints on most other constitutional 
rights asserted by prisoners only need pass Turner s lax reasonable 
relationship test.  Similarly, just because government officials open a faith-
based prison unit does not mean that they must creatively engineer some out-
138. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 72425. 
139. Id. at 724 (quoting Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987)). 
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of-the-ordinary secular unit or programming in order to avoid abridging the 
Establishment Clause. 
Cutter  itself confirms, though, that even though a faith-based unit may 
not inexorably or even usually abridge the Establishment Clause, it may be 
structured or operated in a way that transgresses that constitutional line.  
While the Supreme Court held in that case that RLUIPA is not 
unconstitutional on its face, the Court cautioned that it might be applied in a 
way that violates the Establishment Clause.140  In assessing the merit of a 
claim that a particular religious accommodation afforded under RLUIPA is 
unconstitutional, the Court noted that the effect that the accommodation has 
on other prisoners and on the maintenance of order and security within the 
prison must be considered.141  If the religious accommodation inflicts 
unjustified burdens on other inmates or compromises institutional security, 
a court appropriately may find that RLUIPA, as it is being applied in the case 
before it, violates the Establishment Clause.142
Similarly, if a faith-based unit imposes unwarranted burdens on prisoners 
not living in that unit or jeopardizes institutional security, the unit may 
violate the Establishment Clauses strictures.  Those who evince what is 
often open hostility towards religion may be quick to argue that a faith-based 
prison unit unduly burdens other prisoners because it consumes resources 
that could be used to provide them with more or better programming or other 
benefits.  But courts should be wary of arguments that interlace absence of a 
benefit with the imposition of a burden. 
Whenever government funds are expended to accommodate prisoners 
religious needs or interests, whether for chaplains, chapels, or other 
nonresidential religious services or programs, that money could be used 
elsewhere, often to the benefit of other prisoners.143  The transposition by 
opponents of faith-based units of a benefit that has not accrued into a burden 
would mean that many, if not most, governmental actions taken to 
accommodate prisoners religious practices, needs, and interests are 
unconstitutional, a result palpably at odds with the language and tenor of the 
Supreme Courts decision in Cutter. 
It also bears noting that specialized housing units, which consume 
resources that could be used for prisoners outside those units, are not at all 
uncommon in prisons.  Therapeutic units for inmates who need intensive and 
140. Id. at 72526. 
141. Id. at 72023. 
142. Id. at 726. 
 143. For a capsulization of the amount of money budgeted for faith-based programming in each 
states prisons in 2003, see Survey Summary: Faith-Based Programming, supra note 73, at 1415 tbl.2.  In 
some states, several million dollars were reserved for this kind of programming.  Id.
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holistic substance-abuse treatment, sex-offender units, mental-health units, 
youthful-offender units, and other special units are common features of many 
prisons.144  Yet few would describe these units, which are designed to meet 
the special needs of certain categories of prisoners, as burdens on other 
prisoners.  Nor should faith-based units be perceived as burdensome to others 
simply because they are designed to meet what for some prisoners is another 
kind of unmet special needa spiritual need. 
Finally, those who would hasten to describe every difference in the 
conditions or treatment of prisoners living in faith-based units as the 
infliction of a burden on other prisoners that gives rise to Establishment 
Clause concerns would be mindful to heed the Supreme Courts cautionary 
note in Cutter.  The Court in that case correctly recognized that the so-called 
benefits of a religious accommodation actually may result in the 
imposition of burdens on the person receiving the accommodation, burdens 
to which other prisoners are not subject.145  The Court cited the kosher diet 
consisting of a fruit, vegetable, granola bar, and liquid nutritional supplement 
fed an inmate at every single meal, day in and day out, as an example of a 
benefit that might equally be considered a burden.146
The murky and often indecipherable line between burdens and benefits 
also may be apparent when examining conditions in faith-based units, where 
inmates typically have much less freedom than other prisoners.  These 
inmates may be required to get up at dawn, denied the amount of free time 
that other prisoners enjoy to play cards, socialize, or otherwise do what they 
want, and be subjected to other variant conditions that some or many 
prisoners would perceive as burdens, not benefits.147  Thus, the answer to the 
question whether prisoners incarcerated in faith-based units are reaping 
benefits not shared by other prisoners or are enduring burdens from which 
other prisoners are exempt often will depend, largely or sometimes 
completely, on the eye of the beholder.  For this reason and others 
discussed above, courts should be alert for, and prepared to rebuff, reflexive 
and pedantic arguments that differences in the treatment of prisoners in a 
144. See HARRY E. ALLEN & CLIFFORD E. SIMONSEN, CORRECTIONS IN AMERICA 485 (7th ed. 1995); 
FRANK SCHMALLEGER & JOHN ORTIZ SMYKLA, CORRECTIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 26061, 435, 442
(2d ed. 2005); Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems’ Responses to Youth Violence, 24 
CRIME & JUST. 189, 220 (1998); Jon Nordheimer, New Look at Jail Unit Housing Sex Offenders, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 2, 1994, at B6. 
145. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 721 n.10. 
146. Id.
 147. For a description of the highly structured regimen in one faith-based unit, see Ams. United for 
Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 432 F. Supp. 2d 862, 90103 (S.D. Iowa 
2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 509 F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 2007). 
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faith-based unit are tantamount to the disadvantageous treatment of other 
prisoners that reflects governmental favoritism towards religion. 
C. Neutrality Among Religious Sects 
While many of the arguments that faith-based units evince 
unconstitutional governmental favoritism towards religion founder upon 
close examination, there still are some shoals through which prison officials 
must navigate in order for the units to meet any neutrality requirement 
subsumed within the Establishment Clause.  As mentioned earlier, the 
meaning of that requirement has sparked great debate, particularly on the 
question whether strict neutrality between religion and irreligion is even 
possible.148  But whatever the outcome of that debate, one thing is clear: the 
Establishment Clause generally precludes the government from singling out a 
particular religion for preferential or disadvantageous treatment. 
In Cutter, the Supreme Court underscored that one of the factors 
underlying its conclusion was that RLUIPA was administered neutrally 
among religious sects.149  But acting neutrally with respect to religious sects 
does not mean that there must be, or could be, absolute equivalence in 
governmental actions impacting them.  If prison officials, for example, hire a 
prison chaplain who happens to be a Protestant minister, that does not mean 
that they also must hire a prison chaplain who is an imam, one who is a 
rabbi, another who is a Catholic priest, and an assortment of other chaplains 
to match the denominational preferences and identities of the inmate 
population. 
Ironically, if the government were to strive to achieve a kind of 
egalitarian ideal its efforts not only would inevitably fail, they in fact would 
create different kinds of disparities between inmates of different religious 
faiths.  For example, if there were only a handful of Jewish inmates in the 
prison, the chaplain who is a rabbi could provide them with a greater array of 
religious services than could a chaplain of a different faith ministering to 
several hundred inmates.  One judge noted the similar dilemmatic choices 
confronting prison officials trying to afford equal programming options to 
female inmates, who comprise a smaller percentage of the prison population 
than men, observing that [e]quality of one variable forces inequality of the 
other.  Equality is an arithmetic impossibility.150
148. See supra notes 11820 and accompanying text. 
149. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720, 72324. 
 150. Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1235 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
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Observations that the Supreme Court made in Cruz v. Beto buttress the 
conclusion that the First Amendment does not command that religious 
accommodations be identical for all religious sects.151  The prisoner who 
brought suit in Cruz was a Buddhist who claimed that prison officials were 
providing Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant inmates with an array of 
opportunities to practice their religion with which he was not being afforded, 
some of which were being subsidized by the government.152  While the 
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff must be afforded a reasonable 
opportunity that was comparable to that afforded other prisoners to 
practice his religion,153 the Court added the following, and important, 
addendum: 
We do not suggest, of course, that every religious sect or group within a 
prisonhowever few in numbermust have identical facilities or 
personnel.  A special chapel or place of worship need not be provided for 
every faith regardless of size; nor must a chaplain, priest, or minister be 
provided without regard to the extent of the demand.  But reasonable 
opportunities must be afforded to all prisoners to exercise the religious 
freedom guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments without fear 
of penalty.154
According to this passage in Cruz, it appears that a touchstone for 
deciding if apparent differences in the religious accommodations provided to 
religious sects in a prison impinge on the First Amendment is whether a 
prisoner not receiving a particular religious accommodation, such as the 
services of a state-paid chaplain from the same religious sect as his, has 
reasonable opportunities to practice his religion.  And prison officials also 
must not punish the prisoner or cause him to fear being punished for availing 
or not availing himself of these opportunities. 
Cruz admittedly was a case assessing the scope of protection afforded by 
the First Amendments Free Exercise Clause, not the Establishment 
Clause.155  But it is difficult to envision that the outcome of the case would 
have been different had the prisoner brought his claim under the 
Establishment Clausethat the Court would have concluded that the 
Establishment Clause requires identical facilities, personnel, and other 
 151. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). 
152. Id. at 31920. 
153. Id. at 322. 
154. Id. at 322 n.2. 
 155. The plaintiff in Cruz also averred that he was being denied the equal protection of the law 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 320 n.1. 
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accommodations for each and every religious sect, regardless of the extent of 
the demand for a particular accommodation or other circumstances. 
The way in which the Court ultimately couches the test for ensuring that 
there is the requisite neutrality between religious sects when accommodating 
prisoners religious needs and interests may not necessarily track the 
language in Cruz.  But however the test is worded, it would seem that it 
would need to encompass the idea that seems to pervade the Courts opinion 
in that casethat the government acts without the requisite neutrality 
when it creates a substantial risk of suppressing religious differences.156
CONCLUSION
This Article refutes three of the misperceptions that undergird 
conclusions that faith-based prison units are inherently and inevitably 
unconstitutional: first, that the Establishment Clause applies the same way in 
prisons as it does outside prisons; second, that prisons are so coercive in 
nature that prisoners are incapable of making a true private choice to live 
in a faith-based unit; and third, that the government betrays an 
unconstitutional lack of neutrality on religious matters when it establishes or 
subsidizes a faith-based prison unit. 
That does not mean, of course, that all faith-based units necessarily are 
constitutional.  Just as RLUIPA can be applied in a way that violates the 
Establishment Clause, so can faith-based units be operated in a way that 
contravenes that constitutional provision.  But it is important to at least 
attempt to ensure that broad-brush and at times reflexive arguments asserted 
against them do not discourage these innovative efforts to augment and 
modulate religious programming to better meet the varied religious needs 
and interests of prisoners and further important penological objectives.  As 
prison officials strive to realize these goals in conformance with the 
Constitution, it would behoove them and others to remember that the devil 
is in the details. 
156. See  Esenberg, supra note 119, at 6465. 
